Conditional Not investment advice

Phase 1 found the ZEAL token contract itself clean against raw bytecode — no mint, no admin gate, no blacklist, no tax, not a proxy — but left three questions as flat unknowns: holder concentration, who controls the LP, and the deployer's history. This phase answers all three directly from the chain's own RPC (eth_getLogs, eth_call, eth_getCode) — no block explorer was used as a source, only as later corroboration.

The answers cut both ways. Top-10 holders control 31.67% of supply (20.28% excluding the pool manager and the LP-holding vault). The main pool's $127k liquidity was traced end-to-end to a specific vault contract whose entire bytecode was read — no withdrawal function was found, but that is a "not found," not a certified permanent lock. And the deployer turns out to have shipped a second contract, a "Zeal Wrapped Zcash" (zZEC) token, that resolves phase 1's biggest red flag (the website's wrap/reserve claim) as real — but introduces a new one: its mint() is gated to a single EOA with no visible on-chain deposit proof.

Net effect on the phase-1 verdict: a wash, not a clear upgrade or downgrade. Still conditional. Still not a pass.

Method: everything below comes from direct JSON-RPC calls to https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com (the default Python/urllib User-Agent gets a bare 403 from this endpoint — a curl-style header fixed it; no other workaround needed). Block explorers were used only to corroborate, never as a primary source.

Keccak-256 (evm_hash.py from the evm-token-due-diligence skill) was verified byte-for-byte against pycryptodome on two known vectors before use. A hand-written, stdlib-only CREATE-address derivation was verified against a known reference vector before being trusted for the deployer-history check.

1. Holder concentration

Scanned every Transfer event for the token from deploy block 53,539,580 to a snapshot at 56,099,994 (27,195 events, 2,572 addresses touched), chunking eth_getLogs adaptively — this RPC caps results at 10,000 logs/call and separately times out on wide, log-sparse ranges. Balances were reconstructed by replay; summing every non-zero address plus the 0x0 mint sink nets to exactly zero, confirming no log was missed or double-counted.

Deployer's current balance: 315,623 ZEAL (0.0316%) — matches phase-1 GoPlus exactly, cross-validating the whole reconstruction. Excluding the two clearly-infrastructure addresses (#1 the LP vault, #5 the PoolManager), the remaining top-8 wallets still hold 20.28% of supply.

EIP-7702 pattern: 29 of the top 60 holders carry a 7702 delegation (bytecode 0xef0100 + 20-byte implementation address). 23 of those delegate to the same implementation, 0xe6cae83b...8555b, whose selectors (entryPoint(), execute(address,uint256,bytes), isValidSignature / ERC-1271, ERC-721/1155 receiver hooks) match standard ERC-4337 smart-account software — consistent with mainstream wallet upgrades post-Pectra, not proof of one operator controlling 23 wallets. Confirming common ownership would need each account's owner-key storage slot, under an unconfirmed layout — not attempted.

2. LP custody

Uniswap V4 PoolManager identified with high confidence at 0x8366a39c...0951 — 13 of 14 canonical IPoolManager selectors matched (computed independently via keccak256, not looked up): unlock, initialize, modifyLiquidity, swap, donate, sync, take, settle, settleFor, clear, mint/burn (ERC-6909), collectProtocolFees. Holds 32.25M ZEAL (rising, live) and 13,565+ native ETH. Not at Ethereum mainnet's canonical PoolManager address — this chain has its own independent V4 deployment (Permit2, by contrast, is at the canonical mainnet address).

10 pools exist for ZEAL (vs. 6 visible on DexScreener, which apparently only surfaces pools with meaningful activity). Only the main pool carries the "PonsV2: MemeHook" (0xe5e70264...e044) — Ownable2Step, owner 0x263ed295...019dd, live and not renounced. The hook's own bytecode does not contain the modifyLiquidity selector — it cannot itself add or remove liquidity.

Conclusion: no working on-chain lever was found, in this contract, for its owner or the factory to pull the ~$127k of main-pool liquidity. That is a "not found," not a certified permanent lock — it's a read of what the deployed bytecode contains, not an audit guarantee.

3. Deployer history

Enumerated deterministic CREATE addresses for nonces 0–44 (address = keccak256(rlp([sender, nonce]))[-20:], self-tested against a known vector first). Found 7 contracts directly deployed by this EOA (nonces 0, 5, 8, 9, 16, 38, 40) — ZEAL itself is not among them (deployed via CREATE2 by a factory).

Three more deployer-owned contracts (nonces 16, 38, 40) are Ownable with the same owner but were not further characterized. Nonces 0, 5, 8 do not expose a plain owner() and were not characterized either.

This is factual due diligence, not investment advice — nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell. Read as risk framing only:

• The phase-1 verdict stands: standard token-contract rug vectors are absent, but residual risk sits almost entirely off the token contract, and that residual risk is now better evidenced, not smaller.
• 31.67% top-10 concentration (20.28% excluding infrastructure) is a real, verified number for a token 3 days old — treat it as a material concentration risk regardless of the contract's cleanliness.
• The zZEC "wrap" product's supply integrity currently depends on trusting one private key. If the zealtoken.com narrative is a decision factor, that dependency — not the ZEAL contract — is the thing to weigh.
• "No withdrawal function found" for the LP vault is reassuring but not a locked-forever guarantee; it reflects what one contract's bytecode contains, not a formal audit.

Could not verify (explicit — unknown is not a pass):

• Whether the 23 shared-implementation EIP-7702 accounts are independently owned or commonly controlled.
• Whether zZEC.mint() has any internal check tied to a verifiable real-ZEC deposit, beyond the confirmed onlyOwner gate.
• The purpose of the deployer's other 5 directly-deployed contracts (nonces 0, 5, 8, 16, 38, 40).
• The meaning of two duration constants (7 days / 2 days) found in the zZEC contract's storage.
• Absolute certainty that no path anywhere can withdraw the main pool's LP position — only that none was found in the one contract that holds the NFT.

Present the key findings as a slide deck — arrow keys or buttons to navigate, fullscreen recommended.